Government debt financing - its effects in view of tax discounting by Neil A. Stevens
‘ThE virtues of a balanced gove~ent budget have
long been a subject of controversy among economists,
politicians, and the general public. Debate on this sub-
ject again has heated up in view of the persistence
of inflation and what some consider the inadequate
growth of private investment andthe excessive growth
of government. Recently, a widespread movement has
developed to institutionalize the balanced budget
doctrine via a constitutional amendment,1
The current debate provides an opportunity to
examine the issue of debt- versus tax-financed govern-
ment expenditures. The discussion centers on the dif-
ferential economic effects of debt versus tax financ-
ing of a given level of government expenditures.2
In particular, this article will show that the difference
between public debt financing and current taxes de-
pends upon whether taxpayers correctly anticipate the
future taxes that debt issuance implies. This dis-
1Many supporters of the constitutional amendment to require
a balanced Federal budget are interested in reducing the level
of government expenditures rather than simply eliminating
the possible adverse effects of debt financing.
‘The assumption of a given level of government expenditures
allows the discussion to center solely on the differential fin-
pacts of taxes and debt, and thus to avoid the possible effects
of changes in the composition or level of government expendi-
tures on the economy.
cussion has important implications for the pre-
sumed evils of debt issuance including reduced
investment and economic growth, debt burden on
future generations, increased inflation, and greater
growth of the government sector, as well as the
efficacy of fiscal policy actions. In addition, to the
extent that movements in interest rates are related to
changes in government borrowing, the issue of debt
financing versus current taxation has important im-
plications for the conduct of monetary policy due to
the use of interest rate targeting by the Federal
Reserve.
The Rise in Federal Debt
The amount of government debt outstanding is
the total of past expenditures financed by the
issuance of government debt instead of current taxes,
Outstanding gross Federal debt at the end of 1978
stood at about $750 billion.
Until World War II, there was a marked tendency
to incur deficits during wartime and to run surpluses
following wars to reduce the size of the outstanding
debt. Following World War II, littleattempt was made
to reduce the debt; in fact, debt issuance became a
standard means for the Federal government to finance
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part of its budget outlays.8 For example, the Federal
budget on a unified basis has been in surplus only
twice in the past 20 years and, since 1970, the amount
of Federal debt has more than doubled.4
TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON
GOVERNMENT DEBT VERSUS TAXES
Government can finance a given amount of outlays
by either levying taxes in the current period or by
issuing interest-bearing debt.5 Virtually all economists
consider the choice of debt versus taxes to have differ-
ent economic effects, although differing views have
developed about the specific economic consequences.
•Invegment and Economic Growth
Some economists have emphasized the negative
effects of deficit financing on private investment.6 In
their view, debt issued by the public sector adds to
and competes with the private sector (investment)
demands for saving. As a consequence, interest rates
are bid up and some crowding out of productive
private investment occurs.
This scenario is demonstrated by the saving and
investment diagram in Figure I. Investment is assumed
to be negatively related to interest rates, whereas sav-
ing is assumed to be positively related to both the
interest rate and the level of disposable income. The
initial saving and investment schedules (S~and I~)
are drawn under the assumption that government
expenditures are tax-financed and that the economy is
at full employment.
When debt is substituted for taxes to finance a
given level of government expenditures, the increased
government demand for funds is added to that of the
private sector, as shown by the shift in the investment
schedule from I~to I,. In addition, as a result of the
8Some analysts blame the views of Keynes and his followers on
deficit financing as the key ingredient in changing the tradi-
tional approach of reducing govemment debt outstanding
following periods of wars. See J. M. Buchanan and R. Wag-
ner, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord
Keynes (Academic Press, New York, 1977)
4
Although the Federal debt has grown rapidly in recent
years, Federal debt when measured relative to Gross Nationa]
Product (GNP) has not grown, In fact, the Federal debt
outstanding as a percent of GNP has generally fallen since
World War II. In 1978 Federal debt was about 36 percent
of CNP, down slightly from 1970, and down substantially
from 62 percent in 1958 and 98 percent in 1948.
5
A third altemative, money creation, is not discussed here.
6
For a presentation of the classical theory of public debt, see
Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New










substitution of debt for currently levied taxes, current
disposable income in the private sector is increased.
If the private sector perceives this change to represent
solely an increase in current disposable income, saving
will increase by only a small percentage of the in-
crease in disposable income. As a result, the shift in
the saving schedule, shown by the movement from
So to S~,will not be as large as the shift in the
investment schedule,
The effects of a substitution of debt for taxes
are an increase in interest rates (from r0 to r,)
and a reduction in private investment (from X, to
X,). With a given level of total income, as assumed
in this example, private consumption will be increased
(by the amount X,X0). Thus, private capital forma-
tion is lower in the debt-financed government expendi-
ture case than in the tax-financed one and the
growth rate of the economy is reduced.~
Unlike the classical views described above, Keyne-
sian economists have argued that the economy does
not automatically self-adjust to full employment. These
economists stress the short-run impact of govern-
ment budgetary policies and deemphasize the poten-
tially adverse longer-run effects of debt financing
on investment and economic growth.
~If saving is responsive to interest rate changes, but invest-
ment completely unresponsive, debt financing results in a
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Figure II
In the context of an underemployed economy with
rigidity in wage rates, for example, Keynesians view
debt-financed government expenditures as an im-
portant tool for achieving a level of aggregate de-
mand consistent with full employment and price
stability. When debt is substituted for taxes, they
argue, consumer incomes will be increased by the
amount of the tax cut and, since resources are not fully
employed, crowding out of private expenditures by
higher interest rates would not occur
In the case of full employment, of course, the effects
of substituting debt for taxes are similar to those of
classical analysis, except that Keynesians view this
substitution as inflationary unless accompanied by a
reduction in the money stock. This can be shown
by the standard IS-LM analysis used in most
economic textbooks.8 Assuming a given level of gov-
ernment expenditures, a tax decrease results in an
increase in disposable income and, in terms of the
IS-LM model, the IS curve shifts to the right (to IS,
in Figure II). If, by assumption, Yr represents full
employment, then income has been increased beyond
a level consistent with stable prices. In order to keep
5
For a standard treatment of the IS-LM model, see Cohn
Campbell and Rosemary Campbell, An Introduction to
Money and Banking (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 3rd
Edition, 1978) Chapters 18 and 19. For a more sophisticated
presentation of the IS-LM model, see Thomas M. Havrilesky
and John T. Boorman, Monetary Macroeconomics (AIIM Pub-
lishing Corporation, 1978), Chapters 11-13.
prices from rising, the money stock must be reduced,
which results in a shift of the LM curve to the left.
If a reduction in the money stock shifts the LM curve
precisely to LM1, income is reduced to a level con-
sistent with full employment, Y,. However, interest
rates would be raised from r0 to r, and the mix
between private consumption andinvestment is altered
in a fashion similar to that described by classical
analysis.
Inflation
Classical economists viewed the choice between
debt and taxes as unimportant in determining infla-
tion. Since debt financing, in theft view, results in the
crowding out of private investment, no additional
demands are created with debt-financed over tax-
financed expenditures. Inflation, in their analysis, is
directly related to the growth rate of the money stock.
So long as this growth in moneyis not altered, inflation
is not affected by the debt/tax choice.°
Both modern-thy Keynesians and modern-day
followers of the classical school (sometimes known
as monetarists) often connect deficit spending
with inflation — for entirely different reasons, how-
ever. Keynesian analysis, as noted earlier, implies an
increase in aggregate demand when substituting debt-
financing for current tax-financing of government ex-
penditures. If resources are fully employed, this in-
crease in demand tends to raise nominal income
and prices.
Some monetarists, on the other hand, have noted
an indirect mechanism relating an increase in deficit
financing to inflation.’0 To the extent that deficit
spending leads to an increase in credit demands, up-
ward pressure on interest rates results. If the central
bank operates with an interest rate target and is re-
luctant to raise this target when credit demands in-
crease, the increased deficit will become financed in
°Anassumption often made in the classical framework is that
the velocity of money (or the demand for money) is con-
stant and, in particular, is not responsive to changes in
interest rates. In terms of the IS-LM model shown above,
the classical assumption can be shown by a vertical LM
curve.
10”Federal deficits tend to produce pressure for monetary ex-
pansion. Increased Federal borrowing when added to the
credit demands of the private sector, places upward pres-
sure on interest rates. The monetary authority, however,
can resist these pressures for a short period of time by
buying government securities. Thus, to the extent that ‘low’
interest rates assume a role as an objective of the monetary
authorities, deficit financing tends to accelerate the rate of
monetary expansion.” Keith Carlson, “Large Federal Budget
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Figure III
part by monetary creation, As shown in Figure III
when debt rather than current taxes is used to fi-
nance government expenditures, the IS curve shifts to
IS, and, as a result, the interest rate will rise. If the
central bank attempts to maintain interest rates at r0,
it will expand bank reserves and, hence, the nation’s
money supply. The LM curve, which represents equi-
librium points in the monetary sector, will shift to
LM,. This results in upward pressure on prices as
aggregate demand expands above the level consistent
with full employment at stable prices, Yr.
Burden of the Debt
Deficit financing, it has often been suggested, im-
poses a burden upon future generations. Other
economists, prigiarily Keynesian, have argued that
domestically-held debt imposes no such burden. These
economists argued that government expenditures,
whether debt- or tax-financed, result in a withdrawal
of real resources in the period in which expenditures
are made and that interest payments on domestically-
held debt simply result in income transfers between
taxpayers and debt holders rather than transfers from
one generation to another.”
“E. J. Mishan, “The National Debt is a Burden,” Twenty-one
Popular Economic Fallacies, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), pp. 61-73.
This view of debt burden prevailed until 1958
when James Buchanan’s book, Public Principles of
Public Debt, was published. In the series of articles
that followed the publication of this book, the view
emerged that a burden on future generations could
result from debt financing.12 The “burden of the debt”
literature revealed that, although the withdrawal of
resources by government must occur in the period in
which the expenditures are made, the method of fi-
nancing government expenditures affects the level
of income that future generations inherit. Thus, to the
extent that deficit financing reduces private investment
and, consequently,inherited capital, a burden is placed
on future generations in the form of a lower capital
stock (and a smaller income stream).
THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF
TAX DISCOUNTING
Recent economic literature has focused on the
critical assumptions which give rise to the differential
economic effects of debt versus tax financing. In the
preceding discussion, it was assumed that disposable
income rises by the amount of the reduction in taxes
whenever debt is substituted for taxes. This occurs
only if consumers treat this increase in income like
any other increase in income. Recent discussion, how-
ever, centers upon svhether and under what circum-
stances taxpayers would fully anticipate the future
taxes implicit when the government issues interest-
bearing debt. This issue, sometimes referred to as tax
discounting, is critically important for the differential
effects of debt versus taxes. As Bailey pointed
out, “If indeed households forsee their own and their
heirs future taxes, then given government expendi-
tures have the same effect on private consumption
whether they are financed by taxes or borrowing.”3
Private Versus Government Debt
The essence of the tax discounting issue can be
demonstrated by contrasting private and public debt.
Debt instruments are a mechanism for transferring
saving (current income not spent on consumption
goods) from one individual or organization to another,
In the case of privately issued debt, the borrower
‘
2
A number of these articles are contained in J.
book, Public Debt and Future Generations
Nortb Carolina: University of North Carolina
~‘Martin J. Bailey, “The Optimal Full-Employment Surplus,”
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gains purchasing power over currently produced
goods and services, but at the same time incurs an
obligation to pay back the loan to the lender in the
future. Thus, on net, private debt creation does not
result in the perception of increased wealth in the
aggregate.
The partial t-accounts in Exhibit I demonstrate
these statements. Suppose a large corporation decides
to borrow $1 million by issuing short-term notes,
such as commercial paper, which promise to pay $1
million plus interest to the lender. The lender, for
instance, may exchange demand deposits for another
asset, the commercial paper certificate. The borrower,
on the other hand, receives $1 million inbank deposits,
but at the same time incurs a liability to pay back
the borrowed funds. Thus, on balance, the owners of
the corporation feel no wealthier than before.
The bottom of Exhibit I illustrates the case where
government issues debt whose proceeds are redistrib-
uted in some manner back to the private sector. As
in the case of private debt creation, the private
lenders feel as wealthy as they did initially since the
government promises to pay interest and principal to
the private debt holders. Whether taxpayers foresee
the future taxes that must be levied in order to
service the debt, however, is unclear. In the case of
private debt, the borrower feels no wealthier since an
obligation to pay interest and principal of the loan is
recognized. However, if taxpayers do not anticipate
any of (part of) the future tax liability associated with
the issuance of government debt, then all (part of)
government debt is perceived as an addition to wealth.
Are Government Bonds Perceived
As Net Wealth?
Since David Ricardo, economists have recognized
that, if taxpayers perfectly anticipate the future taxes
associated with government debt issuance, tax financ-
ing and debt financing are essentially equivalent;
that is, taxpayers would consider a tax levy of $1
million today equivalent to the issuance of $1 million
in perpetual bonds. Taxpayers would recognize that,
with the issuance of the $1 million in bonds (at an as-
sumed interest rate of 10 percent), they have incurred
an obligation to pay $100,000 per year in taxes — the
present value of which is $lOO,000/.lO, or $1 million
— the equivalent of the present value of $1 million of
taxes levied currently.
While economists have recognized the possible
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have assumed that the conditions under which com-
plete discounting of the tax liability would take place
are not likely to hold. For example, even if taxpayers
correctly anticipate their share of the tax, complete
discounting requires that they not be able to escape
this liability either by dying or moving from the
government’s jurisdiction.’4
In the case of a tax on property income, the tax
most often used by local governments, this possibility
is less of a problem since the levy of a tax on property
income is likely to result in a decline in property
values equal to the issuance of government bonds.
Since the value of an asset is the discounted value
of its future income stream, a tax upon that stream
14
1n the case of taxes on human income, the possibility exists
that current taxpayers can avoid their share of future gov-
ernment taxes by moving from a government’s jurisdiction.
This option is extremely limited for citizens of a nation but
less so for local government jurisdictions. The clearest case
is that where currently produced govemment services are
debt-financed. Current taxpayers will benefit from the cur-
rently provided government services but will bear little of
the cost in terms of future taxes if they move from the area.
In the case of deficit-financed capital expenditures, current
taxpayers cannot necessarily shift the cost to other taxpayers,
since the future taxes associated with debt finance will likely
be incorporated into property values. The possibility that the
cost of debt-financed government expenditures for current
services can be shifted to others by moving out of the taxing
jnrisdiction of the government helps to explain why local
governments often avoid deficit financing of current budget
expenses. Local governments, instead, often use deficit fi-
nancing for capital expenditures and rely on taxes from
property income, both of which reduce the possibility that
tax burden will be shifted disproportionately to others.
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reduces its market value. For example, a perpetual
asset that is expected to yield $100 a year and for
which the going interest rate is 10 percent has
a market value of $1,000 ($100/.10). A tax of 5
percent on the expected yearly income would reduce
that income stream to $95 a year, and the market value
would fall to $950 ($95/.10). For the economy as a
whole, increasing government debt by $1 million ac-
companied by an increase in property taxes of
$100,000 per year to pay the 10 percent interest rate
on the increased debt would immediately reduce the
value of this property by approximately $1 million
($100,000/b). In this case, the increase in govern-
ment debt does not result in a perception of increased
wealth; taxation and debt are equivalent
It is less clear that full discounting of future tax
liability of debt issuance occurs in the case of taxes
levied on labor income, even when a taxpayer cor-
rectly anticipates his share of the tax liability. The in-
dividual taxpayer will not fully discount his tax liabil-
ity to the extent that future tax payments lie beyond
his life expectancy. He also will not fully take into ac-
count the wellare of his descendants, In this case, an
individual taxpayer will perceive that his lifetime in-
come has risen more (i.e. that he is wealthier) with
debt financing than tax financing of government
expenditures.
Suppose, for instance, that an individual’s share of
the government expenditure is $1,000. The taxpayer is
faced with the choice of a once-and-for-all tax of
$1,000 in the current period or $100 a year to service
interest on a $1,000 government debt (at the assumed
current interest rate of 10 percent). Under the tax-
financed case, the individual meets the tax burden of
$1,000 by reducing his assets by $1,000 (which are
also assumed to yield 10 percent, the going interest
rate). The taxpayer must forego an income of $100
a year, as in the debt-financing option. But suppose
that the individual expects to pay taxes for only 10
years. Under the debt-financed case, the present value
of the tax claim for 10 years is only $614; thus, the
individual taxpayer perceives his wealth to be $386
greater than in the tax-financed case. As a matter of
arithmetic, the greater the life expectancy, the smaller
the perceived wealth effect. For example, with a life
expectancy of 20 years, the debt financing option re-
sults in a $149 increase in wealth while a 30-year life
expectancy yields a $57 increase in wealth. In effect,
wealth is created with debt issuance because some of
the tax liabilities needed to pay future interest pay-
ments are shifted to members of later generations.
To the extent that this increases the taxpayer’s per-
ceived wealth or lifetime income stream, greater cur-
rent expenditures result from debt financing than from
tax financing.
This wealth effect from debt financing will dis-
appear, however, if the tax liabilities shifted to future
generations are taken into account when current tax-
payers plan their bequests and other wealth transfers.
Barro has demonstrated that “finite lives will
not be relevant to the capitalization of future tax
liabilities so long as current generations are con-
nected to future generations by a chain of operative
intergenerational transfers (either in the direction
from old to young or in the direction from young to
old).”15 This is a complicated way of saying that
parents and children can make wealth transfers at
times other than death. For example, parents make
transfers to their children in the form of education,
living expenses, and bequests, and children some-
times provide support for their aged parents. In
effect, these transfers between generations allow cur-
rent taxpayers to act as if they are immortal. Barro
argues that these intergenerational wealth shifts are
sufficientto restore the balance of wealth across gener-
ations that would have been deemed optimal if all




The issue of tax discounting cannot be settled solely
by theoretical arguments. Recently, several empirical
studies have attempted to discover the extent to which
tax discounting actually occurs. Existing evidence is
immense since each economic model that contains
fiscal variables also generates implications for tax dis-
counting. Several large models of the economy have
found, for example, that tax reductions financed by
debt issue have significant effects on income. This pro-
vides indirect evidence that less than complete tax
discounting occurs. Evidence from some reduced-form
models, such as the St. Louis model, shows that fiscal
policy actions, as measured by the high-employment
~
5
Robert J. Barro, ‘Are Covernrnent Bonds Net Wealth?” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, November/December 1974, pp.
1095.
lOOther complications can result in the nonequivalence of debt
and taxes including uncertainty about future taxes and
imperfect capital markets. Barro analyzes these possibilities
and concludes that “there is no pervasive theoretical case
for treating government debt, at the margin, as a net com-
ponent of perceived household wealth. The argument for a
negative wealth effect seems, a priori, to be as convincing
as the argument for a positive effect,” Ibid., p. 1116.
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budget deficit, have no lasting effect on aggregate de-
mand and income. This tends to provide indirect
evidence in favor of full tax discounting.17 This evi-
dence, however, is inconclusive since fiscal effects can
be washed out through such other mechanisms as the
crowding out of private expenditures by higher in-
terest rates.18
Recently, several studies have directly tested the
extent of tax discounting by specifying consump-
tion functions where such variables as the government
deficit and outstanding government debt are tested for
their effects upon consumption. One of the first of
these was by Kochin.’°His study was motivated by
the casual observation that the saving rate as meas-
ured by National Income Accounts (NIA) data and
the level of the deficit are positively correlated —
an observation consistent with the notion of tax dis-
counting. For example, when a deficit results from a
tax cut, measured disposable income rises. In the
case of full tax discounting, consumers realize that
the debt issued to finance the deficit implies future
taxes for themselves or their heirs and, accordingly,
that their lifetime income or wealth is unaltered.
Thus, consumption expenditures are unchanged and
measured NIA personal saving, defined as disposable
income minus consumption expenditures, rises.
Kochin specified consumption of nondurables
and services as a function of disposable income, the
Federal deficit, and lagged consumption. Using an
equation estimated in first differences over the period,
1952-71, he found that a $100 increase in the
Federal deficit results in approximately an $11 de-
cline in consumption. Kochin interpreted this as an
indication that consumers have at least partially
taken into account the future taxes associated with
government deficits.
Kochin’s study generated several criticisms. Yawitz
and Meyer criticized Kochin’s study for misspecifica-
tion because it did not directly include a government
wealth variable.20 Using a life-cycle model in which
consumption is specified as a function of disposable
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income, the market value of pnvate sector holdings
of government securities, and household net worth
(other than government securities), Yawitz and Meyer
observed small positive coefficients on the private
wealth and U.S. Government debt variables which
were not significantly different from each other. They
interpreted these results to indicate that no discount-
ing occurred since government debt outstanding ap-
peared to have an effect on consumption similar to
that of other private wealth. They pointed out that
their results were “inconclusive,” however, “because of
the extremely narrow variability of the Government
debt series.”21
A review of the existing evidence on tax discount-
ing (or, as they call it, debt neutrality) by Buiter and
Tobin also criticized the Kochin study.22 First, the
authors noted that the negative coefficient on the
deficit variable was not as large as the value on the
disposable income variable, and thus the equation
did not support complete discounting. They also ob-
jected to Kochin’s equation because of the simultane-
ity problems with some of the variables used and the
inclusion of the Federal deficit rather than the
total government deficit. When they reran Kochin’s
equation, adding data for 1972-76, they found the
results substantially changed; the coefficient on the
deficit variable, although negative, was not signifi-.
cantly different from zero. When Buiter and Tobin
made several refinements to Kochin’s equation, trans-
forming the variables into per capita terms and intro-
ducing the deficit of the public sector in addition to
that of the Federal government, they found again that
the deficit variable had the correct sign (—) but was
insignificantly different from zero.
In another recent study, Tanner utilized a consump-
tionfunction of the life-cycle type which also included
a number of variables not specified in the Yawitz and
Meyer study.2~The unemployment rate was included
to adjust disposable income for cyclical variation; the
stock of consumer durable goods was added because
it was expected to have a negative relationship with
current consumption expenditures. Additional vari-
ables included were corporate retained earnings, pri- 17
See Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carlson, “A Mone-
tarist Model for Economic Stabilization, this Review (April
1970), pp. 7-25, and Keith M. Carlson, “Does the St. Louis
Equation Now Believe in Fiscal Policy?’ this Review (Feb-
mary 1978), pp. 13-19.
i
t
Keith M. Carlson and Roger W. Spencer, “Crowding Out and
Its Critics,” this Review (December 1975), pp. 2-17.
10
Lewis A. Kochin, “Are Future Taxes Anticipated by Con-
sumers?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (August
1974), pp. 385-94.
2
OJess B. Yawitz and Laurence H. Meyer, “An Empirical In-
vestigation of Tax Discounting,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking (May 1976), pp. 247-54.
2
lWith only small changes in the real value of Government
debt held by the private sector and given the low propen-
sity to consume nut of wealth, only minor effects on aggre-
gate consumption could have been expected. Ibid., p. 253. 22
William Buiter and James Tobin, “Debt Neutrality: A Brief
Review of Doctrine and Evidence’ (Cowles Foundation
Discussion Paper No. 497, Cowles Foundation for Research
in Economics, September 15, 1978). 23J. Ernest Tanner. “An Empirical Investigation of Tax Dis-
counting,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (May
1979), pp. 214-18.
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vate wealth as measured by the net stock of fixed non-
residential business capital and residential housing,
the total government surplus (or deficit), and the mar-
ket value of government debt.
Again, the reasoning behind this equation, similar
to that of Kochin’s, is that “current Government defi-
cits may depress current expenditures because these
deficits imply higher future taxes. This hypothesis
implies that current taxpayers will not consume at the
expense of their heirs but rather will increase their
personal savings so that their bequests, inclusive of
the Government debt, would be the same as if the
Government deficit had not occurred.”24 The hypoth-
esis that full tax discounting occurs, or alternatively,
that government debt is not perceived as net wealth
implies a zero coefficient on outstanding government
debt and a positive (negative) coefficient on the cur-
rent government surplus (deficit). The coefficients
for Tanner’s equation estimated for U.S. data over
the period 1947-74 are consistent with the complete
discounting hypothesis. The coefficient on the gov-
ernment surplus variable was positive and significant;
the coefficient on the Government debt variable was
quite small and not significantly different from zero.
Tanner’s study is subject to criticism, however,
since the private wealth variable also does not have
a coefficient significantly different from zero. This out-
come is doubtful given the large amount of evidence
that has found private wealth to influence current
consumption expenditures. Tanner’s result, however,
may have resulted from the inclusion of retained earn-
ings in his equation. Since retained earnings are a
major source of change to the capital stock, this vari-
able could well reduce the significance of the private
wealth variable. Similarly, the inclusion of both the
government surplus (or deficit) and the outstanding
stock of government debt is a doubtful specification
since the surplus or deficit largely represents the
change in the government debt series.
IMPLICATIONS OF TAX DISCOUNTING
The implications of full tax discounting as sug-
gested in Tanner’s equation are quite important to
the way economists have traditionally viewed a num-
ber of macroeconomic issues. Most basic is the effect
of government debt upon the consumption/saving
mix. As discussed earlier, with a given level of govern-
ment expenditures, both classical and Keynesian econ-





couraged private investment relative to the alternative
of current taxation. But, if taxpayers view government
debt and taxes as equivalent, consumption is not al-
tered from the tax-financed case, and private invest-
ment and economic growth is not hindered.
‘With full discounting, the effects of fiscal actions
also disappear. In terms of the IS-LM model shown
in Figure III, fiscal actions, such as a tax cut with
government outlays unchanged, do not shift the IS
curve to IS, as standard analysis shows. Rather, with
full discounting, the subsequent increase in disposable
income is not viewed by the public as an increase in
net wealth, and therefore, demand for current con-
sumption is not stimulated. On the other hand, less
than full discounting of future taxes leaves open the
possibility that fiscal actions have economic effects.
Even in this case, fiscal policies do not necessarily
have effects on aggregate demand. Various arguments
other than tax discounting have shown how fiscal
policies may be impotent in stimulating aggregate
demand.25
The connection between government deficits and
inflation is also questionable if the issuance of govern-
ment debt is neutral. One connection between deficits
and inflation relies on the premise that government-
issued debt places upward pressure on market inter-
est rates. When the Federal Reserve conducts mone-
tary policy by targeting an interest rate, any upward
pressure on interest rates will induce the Federal
Reserve to make open-market purchases of govern-
ment securities in order to maintain its target. As a
result, undesirable increases in the money stock can
result and eventually inflation will be exacerbated. If
the tax liability associated with deficit spending is
fully anticipated, however, the public will “save” com-
mensurately with the increase in the demand for credit
resulting from the issuance of government debt. In this
case, interest rates are not bid higher than they would
be in the case of tax-financed government expendi-
tures, and therefore the connection between deficits
and inflation via the reaction of the Federal Reserve
to interest rate movements breaks down.
In addition, it has been argued that deficit spend-
ing encourages a larger government sector than would
result from a balanced budget policy. In fact, this
belief underlies the reasoning of many of the current
supporters of the balanced budget constitutional
amendment. Buchanan and Wagner. recent propo-
nents of this view, argue that deficit financing reduces
the perceived cost of government services to current
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taxpayers.26 As a result, government services increase
at a faster rate than actually desired by citizens. This
explanation of the growing size of government de-
pends crncially upon the assumption that less than
full tax discounting occurs.27
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, economic analysts have found that
the choice between debt and taxes has a significant
effect on the economy. To the extent that taxpayers
do not take into account the tax liability associated
with government debt, they will perceive increased
income and wealth when government debt is substi-
tuted for current taxation. As a result, current con-
sumption is encouraged and investment discouraged
in comparison with tax-financed government expendi-
ture. Under this scenario, private capital formation
and the long-term growth of the economy are reduced.
Some recent theoretical and empirical studies have
questioned the analysis underlying these results. These
studies point out that taxes versus debt is really a
choice between taxation today versus taxation tomor-
row. If the future taxes required to service the debt
26J. M. Buchanan and R. Wagner, Democracy in Defleit: The
Political Legaoy of Lord Keynes (Academic Press, New
York, 1977).
27
For a study that finds evidence opposing these views, see
William A. Niskanen, “Deficit, Government Spending, and
Inflation — What is the Evidence?’ Journal of Monetary
Economics (August 1978), pp. 591-602.
are widely perceived by the public, no increase in
private wealth occurs with deficit financing. In this
case, the choice between debt and taxes is essentially
neutral and the presumed benefits of a balanced bud-
get disappear.
Also, the argument for a link between inflation and
deficits is not as strong if tax discounting is assumed.
If the issuance of government debt does not result in
the perception of increased wealth, a given level of
government expenditures financed by debt is no more
expansionary than the same outlays financed by taxes.
Furthermore, since interest rates do not rise in this
case, the mechanism by which deficits raise overall
credit demands and encourage the Federal Reserve
to expand the money supply at a greater rate is also
suspect.
In essence, complete discounting of tax liabilities
implies that the arguments over the relative merits of
balanced and unbalanced budgets are irrelevant. With
complete discounting, neither the potential of un-
balanced budgets (changing taxes with a given level
of government expenditures) to influence aggregate
demand nor the adverse effects of unbalanced bud-
gets on investment, inflation, or the size of govern-
ment exist. Although recent theoretical and empirical
studies lend support to the incorporation of tax dis-
counting into the analysis of debt financing, the evi-
dence does not appear strong enough for one to
completely disregard the possibility of less than full
discounting.
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